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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

No. 6375

GRANT ALLEN ADAMSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Two statements under the heading ''Statement of
Facts'' on page 4 of respondent's brief are erroneous
conclusions, and should be corrected.
One is: ''This intersection is a well-lighted intersection." Since much of the argument of that brief is
premised upon this conclusion, we think it important to
point out that all the evidence in the case indicates that
this is not a well-lighted intersection. On the contrary,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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it shows that the intersection was dark. There was only
one arc light and that was on the southwest cornerthe far corner from both the driver of the truck and
the rider of the bicycle. (Tr. 83). Lights were on both
service stations on the northeast and southeast corners
but these stations were lit to illuminate themselves and
not the road. A careful scrutiny of Exhibit '' D ''-a
photograph obviously taken in the day time- shows the
lighting system used on the two stations. The search
lights shown there are shielded so that the light is
thrown away fron1 the road and on the service stations.
The intersection was definitely not well-lighted.

The other conclusion is an unfortunate phrasing of
the testimony of the location of the defendant's truck
after the accident. Respondent said: ''Defendant's truck
proceeded east on Ninth South Street 157 feet from the
point of impact before it stopped. ( Tr. 100)." There
was no evidence of what the truck did after the accident,
either by tracks or skid marks (Tr. 107) or by eye
witness. Adamson may have stopped it and then pulled
it over to the side of the road out of the way. We know
only that it was on the side of Ninth South Street 157
feet from the probable point of collision some indefinite
time after the accident (Tr. 77, 100).
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ARGUMENT
L There is no Evidence to Support the Verdict.
1.

The Defendant's Speed (Par. (a) of
dent's Brief).

Resp~on

Respondent objects to the fact that counsel for the
- appellant limited his discussion entirely to the miles per
hour which the defendant was going at the intersection
·~ at Ninth South Street and Second West. We submit
....
that regardless of the circumstances, if the unlawful act
to be proved was the defendant's speed, that speed must
be shown. No speed at the intersection was shown. So
to deduce this speed respondent's brief sets forth the
- following points :
(a) Moulton's testimony can be interpreted, saye
the brief, to find that the defendant maintained his
speed of between 35 and 40 miles per hour until he
made his turn. We have already pointed out that
Moulton changed his testimony and did not indicate at
any time where it was that Adamson was driving at that
speed. In a criminal case we must not deal in speculation, especially as there is direct evidence contradicting
this inference. The positive evidence in the case, contradicting respondent's inference, is that the defendant
drove slowly into the intersection. (Tr. 115).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(b) The jury, says the respondent, could have
taken into consideration the fact that the defendant's
truck was driven a distance of 157 feet from the point
of i1npact before he brought it to a stop.
There is no evidence that the defendant drove 157
feet before he brought his truck to a stop. There is no
evidence of what he did after the impact except walk
toward the place of the accident after he had parked
the truck ( Tr. 77). We know only that when the officer~
arrived on the scene some tilne after the accident,
Adamson's truck \Vas on the side of the road 157 feet
from the probable point of impact. Adamson may have
stopped in the 1niddle of the road immediately after
the impact and then driven his truck off the side of the
road. Or he may have chosen to drive until he got off
the road. We must remember he was driving a long
truck with three sets of wheels (Exhibit "A"), and
that some distance is required to get a long truck off
the road to clear it for passing traffic. By no right
can we infer without any evidence that Adamson could
not bring his truck to a stop before the place where he
parked it.
(c)

The jury, said the respondent, could also have

considered the force with which Kanon was struck, as
evidenced by the various injuries which he received. As
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a matter of fact the bodily injuries of Kanon have no
bearing upon the speed of the truck. It is co1nmon
knowledge that a slight impact by a heavy body against
a light one can seriously injure the light one regardless
of the speed of the heavier body.
(d)

In a fourth attempt to show speed the respon-

dent claims that the jury could take into consideration
the traffic on the highway and the hazard at the intersection and any other conditions therein existing in
determining whether or not the defendant was driving
at a speed which was greater than was reasonable and
prudent. This statement is true as far as it goes but
it involves two factors: first, the traffic, and second,
the speed. There is evidence of the traffic, but this is
not enough. For the jury to determine whether or not
the speed was greater than was reasonable and prudent
there must be evidence of this speed. There is none.
Respondent argues that since the defendant did not see
the Kanon boy, and since there is no evidence that the
defendant turned in any manner to avoid the collision,
he therefore was speeding.

Obviously this does not

follow. It is a dangerous assumption, made even more
vicious by the added assumption that the intersection
was well-lighted. We have pointed out that the evidence
was that the intersection was dark (Tr. 87). Another
dangerous inference expressed by the respondent is the
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defendant's "inability to bring the truck to a stop within
less than 157 feet.'' There is not a fragment of
evidence of any inability to bring the truck to a stop
within any distance, nor any evidence that the truck
was not brought to a stop before Adamson drove it to
the side of the road where the officers measured its
location. The \Vhole argument is based upon the "if"
clauses on page 10: ''If he \vas going at a speed ...
If he \Vas not looking . . . '' Anglo-American justiee
does not permit us to deprive a man of his liberty
by adding up several hypotheses to make a fact. The
whole argument of respondent is that defendant was
driving at a rate of speed that was not reasonable and
prudent because he had an accident; because he had an
accident he was driving at an excessive speed; therefore,
because he was driving at an excessive speed he had an
accident.
'' Explanations by reasoning back from results with no place to land are not helpful. They
lead to speculations only'' - Mr. Chief Justice
Moffat, in State v. Chealey, ______ Utah ______ , 116
P. (2d) 377.
The case of Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123 N. E.
689, is analogous in its facts to the case at bar in this:·
That in both cases the driver of the car was faced with
an unexpected presence of a child in the front of the
car.

Respondent argues that Adamson should have
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anticipated the bicyclist's presence because he was at
. . the intersection. This would ordinarily be true, and
might be true in this case if it were not for the fact
that Kanon 'vas violating the law in the two particulars
mentioned in the appellant's main brief, that is, he was
riding his bicycle in the dark without a lamp and he
was out in the inside lane of traffic instead of near
the curb where the ordinance and prudent driving required him to be. Regardless of how careful Adamson
might have been under this state of facts the same
accident could have happened.
2.

Proper Lookout (Far. (a) of Resp·ondent's
brief).

By a summation of inferences respondent argues

that because the Kanon boy was hit, Adamson failed
to keep a lookout. We submit that the accidental striking in the dark of a boy on a bicycle without lights
in the middle of the street where he is not supposed
to be does not denote failure to keep a lookout, especially when we take into consideration the added confusion of lights in the service station and the presence
of the car which preceded the bicycle through the intersection.
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3.

Alleged Failur.e to Yield (Par. (b) of Respondent's Brief).

Before there can be violation of law for failure to
yield. the right of way there must be such a right. Respondent says that Sylvester Kanon had this right.
We should bear in mind the discussion and authorities
starting on page 24 of appellant's main brief and in
the latter part of this brief on this point: Sylvester
Kanon when he rode his bicycle into the intersection
unlawfully, lost the right of way, which he other\\'ise
would have had by virtue of the statute.

In Logan v. Schjeldahl, 66 N. D. 152, 262 N. W. 463,
the court said :
"When a driver operates his vehicle in an
unlawful manner, as for instance by driving at
an excessive speed, he loses the right of precedence which would be his under the statute had
he been complying with the law, or as stated in
Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Permanent Edition, Sec. 1009, 'He loses
his statutory preferential status.' ''
Other authorities on this point are quoted under Part
II of this brief.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
4.

There is no E·vidence That the Defendant
Violated the Reckless Driving Statute. (P·ars.
(c) and (d) of Resp.ondent's Brief).

There is no new evidence mentioned in this section
of respondent's brief and it becomes a sumn1ary of the
other allegations which were not proved: Alleged speed
which was not reasonable and prudent, alleged failure
to keep a lookout, and alleged failure to yield a right
of way. There being no evidence to support any one of
these three claims, the charge of violating the reckless
driving statute which depends upon them must, of course,
fail also. We should note, however, that the brief makes
statements in this section which are not borne out by
the evidence. There is no evidence, for example, that
the defendant drove between 30 and 35 miles per hour
until he arrived at the intersection, and of course no
evidence that defendant "just sailed" through the intersection. Such assertions are misleading conclusions.
Again respondent says the intersection was "well-lighted". Constant repetition of those words does not make
them a fact.
5.

Authorities Cited by Respondent (Par. (e) ).

Though respondent admits that decisions relating
to the sufficiency of evidence in involuntary manslaughter cases are not very helpful, he cites several
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
of them. '"'e should, therefore, analyze their facts and
contrast thern with the lack of evidence of recklessness
in the case at bar.
In People v. Smaszcz, 344 Ill. 494, 176 N. E. 768,
the court found that the evidence indicated that the
defendant was going at an excessive rate of speed at
the time of the collision. What was this

evidence~

A

witness saw the defendant's car jerking along after
the accident, which showed, the court said, that the
brakes had been applied and were checking the Inoinentum of the car, which nevertheless ran 45 feet before
it stopped. The force of the collision between the auto-

mobile and human flesh was so great that it sounded
like two automobiles coming together. The street intersection was well-lighted. The automobile showed the
force of the collision. The right headlight was dented,
its glass broken, the reflector dropped out, the Inetal
rod between the headlights was broken, and the left
fender was badly damaged.
''The broken bar and dented metal showed
the force was extreme, particularly when it is
considered that the collision was not of n1etal
but of metal with human flesh, and that the bodies
of the three women were thrown or dragged .J.;)
feet from where they were struck...
"The flight of the plaintiff in error from
the scene of the collision without any effort to
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ascertain the extent of the injuries caused by
his act or to help the injured persons Inay a.lso
be taken into consideration as evidence of guilt.''
And in State v. Bedinger, 126 N. J. L. 288, 19 Atl.
(2d) 322, a 'vitness in a rear upstairs room of the building away from the intersection heard the crash. The
court said she was ''at a considerable distance a'vay
under conditions none too favorable.'' This impact of
an automobile with human flesh smashed the headlights

and completely broke the grille work of the car, though
the grille work was such that an expert testified it would
not break unless under a severe impact. In this case,
also, the defendant ran away from the scene, and the
court said that his statement that the happening in
question never occurred so far as he knew, could be
taken in connection with the other evidence. Compare
the damage done to the automobiles in this case and in

People v. Smaszcz, supra, with the slight damage done
to the defendant's truck in the case at bar. Officer
Anderson testified :
''There was, about in the center of the bumper there was a long scratch mark, possibly inflicted by coming in contact with metal. The grill
was bent, and I found a cap and a top of a fruit
jar bottle, the lid of a fruit jar bottle was laying
on the fender, and there was milk spilt all over
the windshield and also the hood and left fender.''
(Tr. 108).
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No one examining the appearance of the truck in
Exhibit "A" and that of the bicycle in Exhibit "C"
can claim very ardently that the truck could have been
going very fast and yet cause so little damage to the
vehicles.
In its discussion of State v. Elliot, 8 Atl. ( 2d) 873,
respondent's brief assumes again that the defendant
tried to stop his truck as soon as he could. This assumption, of course, is unfounded against the evidence that
he drove it over to the side of the road. St,ate v. Elliot
is the decision of a lower court of Oyer and Terminer.
Respondent's brief cites People v. Przybyl, 365 Ill.
515, 6 N. E. (2d) 848, as authority for the proposition
that failure of the driver to have his car under such
control that he could avoid a; collision was an utter
disregard of the safety of others. But compare the
facts of that case. The defendant in that case traveling
east in a taxicab swung to the north rail of the \Vest
bound street car track, passed an automobile at about
45 miles per hour in a district in which the speed limit
was 35, struck the deceased and threw him directly
east 40 or 50 feet, skidded about 75 feet to the south
curbing and struck a post, shearing it off. The defendant said he saw the deceased when the deceased was
about 15 or 20 feet in front of him. The court said:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Not every violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law amounts to criminal negligence, for the
reason that not all such negligence is reckless
or wanton and of such a character as sho,vs an
utter disregard for the safety of others ; but,
'vhere excessive speed in passing other cars is
combined with disregard for persons or things
approaching or crossing, whom the passing driver
cannot see, such is evidence of criminal negligence.''
In the case at bar there is a complete absence of
such excessive speed and of any disregard of persons.
The defendant ran against a boy who unlawfully suddenly appeared before him in the dark.
The facts of C.ornett v. Commonwealth, 282 Ky.
322, 138 S. W. (2d) 492, are not at all comparable with

those of the case at bar. In this case the defendant had
been warned in advance of the children playing with a
ball on the edge of a highway. In ·.the case at bar the
defendant was suddenly confronted with an emergency
not of his own making.
The authorities cited on page 20 of respondent's
brief are not applicable to the instant case because in the
case at bar there is no evidence of speed. Further discussion of them would be pointless.

In State v. Biewem, 169 Iowa 256, 151 N. W. 102,
the court said that the death of the child might well
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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have been found in consequence of the recklessness of
the driver. But in that case the child was in the road
in plain view in broad daylight. The court said:
'' Counsel suggest that, as the child was
found "\vest of the center of the road, the driver's
attention may have been distracted by the dog
on the east side, and the child, in following the
dog, may have run out in front of the car. A
sufficient response to this is the mother's testimony that the child was in the road in plain
vie"\v. ~Ioreover, the driver must have been a"\vare
of striking the child, and moving on without
stopping or tendering assistance was a c1rcun1stance indicative of guilt on his part.''

People v. lllcKeon, 236 N. Y. S. 591, 134 Misc. Rep.
697, the last case on sufficiency of evidence in Respondent's brief, is a case from the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, and, of course, is not
an authority.

II.

The Court Erred in Directing the Jury.
1.

Instructions On the Right Of Way. (Par. (a)
-of Respondent's Brief).

The court included failing

to

yield the right of way

in its fifth instruction which purported to set forth the
law an infraction of any part of which would constitute
grounds for conviction. Exception was properly taken
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
to this, and we submit that by including the fifth subsection of this instruction, the court committed reversible
error.
Sylvester Kanon did not have the right of 'va-y for
two reasons: (a) because his violation of la'v in failing
to have a light on his bicycle, and in failing to keep
on the right side of tha road cancelled his statutory
preferential status; and (b) because there was no evidence to show his relative position to come under the
right of way statute.
In appellant's main brief it was pointed out that
one who is himself violating the law can not claim the
;

right of way which he otherwise would have had. This
doctrine is sometimes set forth in statutes (interpreted
in Johnson v. Selfe, 190 Minn. 269, 251 N. E. 525 and
Morris v. Bloomgren, 127 Ohio St. 147, 187 N. E. 2).

We submit that it is immaterial whether the statute so
contains it or not. The necessary implication is there
that the one claiming the right of way must himself be
driving legally. The cases so hold.
In Boyd v. Close, 82 Colo. 150, 257 P. 1079, Boyd
made a left turn at an intersection and the defendant
coming straight through the intersection from the right
collided with him. The defendant answered that he had
the right of way and that Boyd's failure to yield conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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stituted contributory negligence.

The court said that

ordinarily he who turns must yield; but in this case
defendant was violating the speed limit and was driving
while intoxicated. Boyd was handicapped by the night,
the lights, the locations of the cars, and falling snow.
'' \\re are now asked to fix responsibility in
every case of automobile crossing collision in
favor of the car having the right of \vay under the
strict provisions of statute, ordinance, or rule of
the road, notwithstanding drunkenness, gross
negligence and excessive speed, and not,vithstanding every reasonable precaution exercised by the
other under circun1stances \vhich the first driver
knew, or should have known, would in all probability prove ineffectual; to outlaw every lefthand driver and give carte blanche to every righthanded driver to run him down. The mere statement of the proposition is its O\Vn refutation. \Ve
know of no court that has ever countenanced it,
and \Ve expressly repudiate it.''

In Andrus v. Hall, 93 Colo. 526, 27 P. (2d) 495,
quoted in appellant's main brief, the defendant approached the intersection from the plaintiff's right and
ordinarily would have had the right of way. However,
he entered it at a speed in excess of the speed limit.
The court held that a driver cannot be required to yield
the right of way when his inability to know and act is
chargeable to the lawless conduct of him who claims it.
Respondent claims that if this court rules that
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Kanon, through his violation of law, thereby lost his
right of way, then it would have to hold that Adamson
could run hin1 down at ""ill or that Adamson could take
the right of 'vay from Kanon. This does not follow at
all. Taking a preferential right from Kanon 'vould not
give it to Adamson; it would leave both parties under
their common law duty to exercise care.
In Logan v. Schjeldahl, supra, the court phrased
this as follows:
''This does not mean, however, that the
driver who thus loses his right of 'vay becomes
a trespasser on the highway, neither does it mean
that the right of way so lost is conferred upon
the driver of another car."
Of course Adamson could not run Kanon down if
he saw him, but neither could the court tell the jury that
Kanon had the right of '\vay and that because Adan1son
failed to yield this right of way he could be found guilty
of violating the law and therefore criminally negligent.
The district attorney argued the right of way before
the jury. We have no way of knowing that this part
of the instruction was not the basis of the verdict. The
giving of the instruction on the right of way constituted
a reversible error.

Let us remember that Kanon 's

violation of law was in two serious particulars, either
one of which may have been the proximate cause of
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the accident: his riding without a light on his bicycle
in the dark made his presence unknown; his riding on
the inside lane of traffic placed him where he could not
have been expected. Respondent contends that since
there is no curb in the intersection, Kanon "\Vas not
required to turn his vehicle to the northeast to follow
the pedestrian lane.

Such an interpretation of the

ordinance would permit Kanon to ride straight out fro1n
the curb line south of Ninth South Street and after he
had crossed the intersection suddenly find himself with
a duty of making a right angle turn in the face of northbound traffic in the righthand lane in order to approach
the curb where the ordinance required him to be. The
ordinance provides that bicycles shall drive as closely
as practicable to the righthand edge or curb. Obviously
it contemplates the turn by the bicycle at Ninth South
Street toward the east so as to continue its course to
approach the righthand edge and curb on the northeast corner.
Respondent claims that the balance of the right of
way statute was properly left off because there was no
evidence that the defendant gave a signal. We submit
that this requirement would shift the burden of proof,
particularly as the requirement of signaling for a left
turn would not be pertinent to Kanon, the driver of the
vehicle from the opposite direction.
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2.

Refusal to Instruct ,on the Q,onduct of the Deceased as the Proximat-e Cause of the Accident.
(Par. (b) of Respondent's Brief).

In its discussion of appellant's argument that the
jury were deprived of proper instruction on the deceased's conduct being the proximate cause of the accident, respondent's brief cites a number of cases which
hold that contributory negligence is not a defense in a
manslaughter action. We take no issue with that point.
The jury 'vere not entitled to an instruction that the
contributory negligence of the deceased would bar conviction of the defendant. They were entitled, however,
to the requested instructions on the conduct of the deceased as the proximate cause of the accident. If Kanon 's
illegally riding without a light in the darlmess vvas the
cause of Adamson's failure to see him, it, and not any
negligence of Adamson, vvas the cause of the accident,
and the jury were entitled to pass on that point. If
Kanon's illegally being in the middle of the road 'vas
the cause of the accident or combined with not having
a headlight as the cause of the accident, the jury were
entitled to determine that point. And the court's refusal
to instruct them on Kanon 's specific conduct as the
proximate cause of the accident was prejudicial to the
defendant's rights to a fair trial.
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In respondent's discussion of the requested Instruction No. 15 on page 27 it does not state the grounds
of the objection to the sentence: "You are instructed
that a driver may presume that others in the road will
conduct themselves in a lawful manner,'' except to state
that it is improper, citing State v. Campbell, 82 Conn.
671, 74 Atl. 927. This case does not rule on the question
presented; the instruction there refused stated that the
State must prove that the deceased's own negligence
was not the proximate cause of the injury.
Respondent also cites Blackford v. Kaplan, 135
Ohio St. 268, 20 N. E. (2d) 522. In this case, it is true,
the refusal of a requested instruction similar to the first
sentence of requested Instruction No. 15 was held proper.
That instruction was:
''You are instructed that every person in the
lawful use of the highways in this state has the
right to assume that every other person using the
said highways will do so in a lawful manner.''
The only reason given for such a holding was that
it was incomplete in that it did not contain the words:
''In the absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary'',
or similar language. If there was evidence in that case
that the defendant had notice of the plaintiff's unla,vful
act, the objection would be valid, otherwise, the decision
is against the general rule. The only authority cited
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~

by the Ohio court on that point was the eighth paragraph
~. of the syllabus of Swoboda v. Brown, 129 Ohio St. 512,
~ 196 N. E. 27 4, a case 'vhich did not involve the question.
It
The text of the case stated the law and approved the
inclusion of notice in the instruction, but did not pass
.....

on its exclusion:
''No fault may be ascribed to failure to
anticipate negligence of another. On the contrary,
one may rightfully assume the observance of the
law and the exercise of ordinary care by others
until the contrary is made to appear. Action in
accordance with such presumptions, in the absence
of notice or knowledge to the contrary, is not
negligence. Norris, Ex 'x v. Jones, Rec.'r. 110
Ohio St. 598, 144 N. E. 274. Hence there was
no error in the requested instructions e1nbodying
that principle.''
In Heg v. Mullen, 115 Wash. 252, 197 P. 51, the
court points out that where the evidence shows actual
notice of the other party's violation of law, the right
to presume that the other is observing it ceases to exist.
The instruction there was as follows:
'' 'You are instructed that persons upon the
public highway, as were the plaintiffs at the time
of the collision, had the right to presume that the
defendant, in the operation of the said automobile, would comply with the statute pertaining
thereto. • • *' "
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The court said:

'' While this instruction states the law correctly as a general proposition, it was incorrect as
applied to the facts of this case as testified to by
the respondents. It will be remembered that they
testified that when they were making the turn
at the intersection of the road they saw the appellant's car coming at the rate of 45 or 50 miles
an hour. Under these circumstances it would be
incorrect to instruct that the respondents had a
right to assume that the appellant was obeying
the law." (Italics ours)
In Harris v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 161 P. 1155, L. R.

A. 1917 C, 477, the court said:
'' 'The general rule is that every person has
a right to presume that every other person 'vill
perform his duty and obey the law; and in the
absence of reasonable ground to think otherwise,
it is not negligence to assume that he is not
exposed to danger which can come to him only
from violation of law or duty by such other person.' 29 Cyc. 516; l\{eflin v. Spazier, 23 Cal. App.
242, 137 Pac. 1078. Such person must of course,
himself use reasonable care to observe the conduct of the other person so far as such conduct
may affect his o''Tn safety at the time. The plaintiff had the right to assume that the defendant's
automobile, or any other vehicle coming westerly
on Seventh street, would confine its travel to the
righthand side of the street, as provided in the
ordinance aforesaid, unless and until, in the reasonably careful use of her faculties, she had
reasonable cause to believe otherwise.''
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And in Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 Utah 583, 176
P. 267, this court is on record against respondent's
·' contention. The instruction there .approved was as

...

fol~

lows:
'' 'You are further instructed that a street
sweeper or a pedestrian who undertakes to use
the street in· the line of his employment 'vhere
it is frequently used by automobiles or other
vehicles, has the right without looking and listening to presume that drivers of automobiles are
observing the law, and they will so reduce or
gauge their speed and are so conducting themselves so as to meet the obligations which circumstances demand of them at such places.' ''
The court said :
''The instruction, in effect, merely informed
the jury that the plaintiff had a right to assun1e
that the driver of the automobile 'vould exercise
ordinary care in driving the car. This certainly
is the law everywhere. No one using a public
street or being lawfully thereon is required to
assume otherwise than that all persons using the
same will exercise ordinary care in doing so and
will not expose any one on the street to unnecessary danger. ' '
At the oral argument it was suggested that the doctrine of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Company, 80 Utah 331, 15 P. ( 2d) 309, has overruled the

Ferguson case and is a committal by this court against
the general ruling set forth in the preceding cases. We
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respectfully submit that this is not so. The Dalley case
did involve the driving of an automobile into a truck
illegally parked on the highway and the case held that
it is negligence as a matter of law for a person to drive
an automobile upon a traveled public highway used by
vehicles and pedestrians at such a rate of speed that the
said automobile can not be stopped within the distance
at which the operator of the said car is able to see objects
on the highway in front of him. To this extent, as applied to ~ivil negligence, it may be a limitation upon the
general rule that one has a right to presume that others
will obey the law. But the doctrine of "the assured
distance ahead'' has taken a direction peculiar and distinct in itself. The Dalley case has gone farther than
any of the Utah cases on the point, and later cases have
limited its application rather than extended it. Both
Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, 98 Utah 253, 98 P. (2d)
363, and Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P. (2)
117, show that a driver need not at all times be on his
guard against one illegally on the highway. We submit
that whatever limitations the D,alley case places on the
general rule, they should not be extended.
It is significant that two of the states in the foregoing opinions, Ohio and Washington, which approved
the general rule in the cases heretofore cited had prior
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sured clear distance ahead" rule. Werner v. Rowley,
129 Ohio St. 15, 193 N. E. 623; Ebling v. Nielson, 109
--

Wash. 355, 186 P. 887.
In Olson v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Company, 98 Utah
208, 98 P. (2d) 944, this court held that when a railroad

company is using its right of way in a careful and lawful
manner, it has a right to presume that motorists on
crossing streets will proceed lawfully and carefully and
will drive with their cars in such control as to be able
to stop within the distance at which they can see objects
ahead.
Let us remember, too, that we are dealing in the
case at bar with the definition of criminal negligence.
We submit that the words of Mr. Justice Larson in his
dissenting opinion in Moss v. Christensen-Gardner,
supra, are applicable in the case at bar:
''But when one is unlawfully upon the highway, is making an unlawful use of the highway, he
should not be permitted to impose upon another
making a lawful use thereof the duty of protecting
him in his unlawful use. To a wrongdoer the
driver owes only the duty of not wilfully injuring
him or his property. Since the wrongdoer is not
lawfully upon the highway the driver is not
charged with anticipating his presence there and
is not impressed with the duty of protecting him
to the same extent as he owes to one making
lawful use of the highway.''
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The court committed error· in refusing to give requested instruction No. 15 so that the jury could properly arrive at a definition of criminal negligence.
Respondent also objects that requested Instruction
No. 15 was too general in not informing the jury what
unlawful conduct of the deceased would bring about such
results, citing Blackford v. Kaplan, supra. In that case
the instruction read:
" 'Right of way' means the right of a vehicle
to proceed. uninterruptedly in a lawful manner
in the direction it is moving in preference to
another vehicle approaching from a different
direction into its path. You are therefore instructed that if you find that the defendant in
approaching or entering the intersection 'vhere
the collision in this case took place was not
proceeding in a lawful manner, he therefore did
not enjoy any preferential status or privilege over
the driver of, the other car which the statutes
of Ohio might have otherwise given him.''
The court said of that requested instruction:
''This request is objectionable for the reason
that it does not explain what acts would be unlawful and work a forfeiture of the preferential
right; it should not be left to the jury to determine what was or was not lawful and in accord
with the statutes. The explanation, however,
might well be given ~in ~other instructions by the
court; but the record does not show such an
explanation was ·anywher-e made s~o as to clarify
the request." (Italics ours.)
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~

This instruction would have been good if other

~: instructions had clarified what the unla,vful act was.

In the case at bar, defendant's requested instructions
Nos. 12, 13, 18, and 20 clearly set forth to the jury what
&1

Kanon 's unlawful acts were.
When respondent, in attempting to defend the refusal to give defendant's requested instructions Nos.

20 and 21 says that there was no evidence to justify
these instructions because Kanon was as close to the

righthand curb as was practicable, as long as there was

I~

a curb where he was riding, respondent does not face
the fact that Kanon was riding straight out in the
direction in which he had been riding and did not turn
east to follow the pedestrian lane ( Tr. 89) . His course
would immediately throw him into the center lane of
traffic (Tr. 33). The officers' measure1nents also indicate this clear course of the deceased (Exhibit "B ").
To say that Kanon was not violating the ordinance because there was no curb in the intersection is specious.
At the time of the collision he was already out in the
road and headed straight on a line which 'vas rnore
than 22 feet from the east curb of Second West street
south of Ninth South. There was a clear violation of
law.
Respondent urges that in Instruction 7A the court
sufficiently instructed the jury as to the conduct of the
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deceased. In that instruction the court told the jury
to consider the conduct of the deceased, but in no way
detailed any of that conduct or told the jury that the
deceased's conduct was unlawful. The court refused
to do this when it refused to give the instructions relating to the failure of Kanon to have a light on his bicycle
and his not being on the extreme righthand edge of the
road. This has nothing to do with the question of the
deceased's contributory negligence that the respondent
argues about at length on pages 31 et seq. The jury
must be told that the conduct of the deceased was illegal
before the jury can properly determine whether or not
the defendant was negligent in failing to see Sylvester
Kanon. It is possible that the whole question of guilt
of the defendant because of failure to keep a lookout
depended upon the jury's knowledge that Kanon's acts
were unlawful. This is why it was so essential that
these instructions be given.
3.

The Burden of Proof Was C·ast on the Defendant by the Giving of Instruction No. 7A. (Par.
(c) -of Respondent's Brief).

Counsel submitted that appellant can not take advantage of the court's adding the last sentence in its
Instruction No. 7A, because exception was taken to the
whole instruction and not to the last part only. ResponSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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,..,

· ~ dent properly points out that the reason for requiring
!D.~ exceptions to parts of an instruction when any of the
~~

instruction ~s good, is to point out specifically to the
court the error it makes in any part of the instruction.
·- We submit that the manner of taking this exception
~ ~-

to Instruction No. 7A brings it within the reason and
the rule. In defendant's requested instruction No. 9
~-~ · defendant requested what became the first sentence of
Instruction No. 7A. The court on its own volition added
-.: the second sentence. Clearly the court could not presume,
~.: when defendant excepted to Instruction No. 7A, that he
-- was excepting to that part of the charge he had already
~?

requested. The exception therefore 'vent to the second
part.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the state did not prove any violation
of the law by the defendant and that on the 1neager
proof adduced the case should have been disn1issed.
In State v. Chealey, ______ Utah ______ , 116 P. (2d) 377, this
court said, referring to that defendant:
"Aside from the naked facts that the d~fen
dant drove his auto-truck off the right hand side
of the highway- the side upon which he 'vas
lawfully driving, there is no evidence as to carelessness or heedlessness ; - none as to doing so
in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of
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others. Turning off on the right hand side of the
road might have been the result of a temporary
diversion of attention to which all persons are at
times subject, or falling asleep, or the approach
of another car in the defendant's lane of the highway as maintained by him. The point is that the
state made no attempt to explain any reason of
circumstance or condition or cause other than the
turning of the auto-truck off the high,vay. No
attempt was made by the state to sho'v that any
person upon the highway was endangered. Explanations by reasoning back from results with
no place to land are not helpful. They lead to
speculations only.''
In the principal case likewise there is nothing to
show that carelessness and heedlessness in wilful or
wanton disregard for the safety of others which must
be found to sustain this conviction of manslaughter.
The State's whole case rests upon the fact that there
was a collision. We submit that none of the other evidence upon which respondent's brief tries to weave a
case in any way shows recklessness on the part of the
defendant.
Even if there had been evidence from which the
jury might have found recklessness, the court deprived
the defendant of the right to have the jury ascertain
the facts. It kept from them the fact that the deceased's
conduct was unlawful. Finally, it presented to the jury
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~· as a possible basis of conviction an alleged failure on

~ the defendant's part to yield the right of way when the
· right of way was non-existent.

~·

~
~.
~

Respectfully submitted,

MOYLE, RICHARDS AND..
McKAY,
Attorneys for D.efendant
and Appellant.
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